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Donald P. Gaver and Patricia A. Jacobs 
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1411 Cunningham Road, Monterey, CA  93943-5219 USA 
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Abstract 
A time-critical military mission must be completed before a random 
deadline to be successful. The mission requires a number of  
Blue assets; the more assets that can be assembled before the deadline, the 
greater the possibility of mission success. Traditionally, military 
Command and Control (C2) has a hierarchical structure: information is 
centrally stored and decision makers are also centralized. The paradigm of 
Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) implies a more horizontal C2 structure. 
There is often little communication infrastructure on the battlefield.  
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) communication networks are attractive enablers of a 
horizontal C2 structure. A stochastic model is used to discuss the benefits 
and possible vulnerabilities of a P2P-enabled C2 structure for a time-
critical mission. The P2P architecture can result in larger probabilities of 
mission success than centralized C2. However, its benefits are nullified if 
the time it takes to assemble the needed Blue assets becomes larger than 
that for the centralized C2. 
 
1. Problem Formulation 
We consider here the situation in which a single opponent Red Agent (RA) moves 
surreptitiously in a designated subregion, either on earth/terrain or on or below a 
maritime littoral surface. Its mission may be any of a variety of options. For instance, a 
TEL (Transportable Erectable Launcher) is a land-based SCUD missile launcher that tries 
to elude detection by hiding under bridges or trees, or in caves, or even in partially empty 
buildings, such as barns. It becomes visible (vulnerable to attack) when it sets up to shoot 
at remote Blue assets, or when it is in motion across terrain (along a road) in its assigned 
subregion or sector. Otherwise, it is invisible (hiding or concealed). This type of target is 
called a time-sensitive target.1 Alternatively, Blue is protecting a littoral domain, and an 
overhead sensor is searching for a Red (hostile and possibly lethal) platform attempting 
to reach, and damage, Blue assets. Overhead sensors identify the Red amongst a large 
background of harmless White/Friendly vessels; once identified (possibly incorrectly) 




Another interpretation is that “the Red” is actually a friendly (Blue) downed pilot in 
hostile territory, and is moving about to avoid capture by opponent-Reds. Blue 
rescuers/recovery teams try to find and recover the pilot before hostile capture occurs. 
Each subregion (one of many that comprise a larger total region) is assumed for the 
present to be covered by two Blue Agent (BA) types: there are sn  Blue Surveillance 
Agents (BSAs) and bn  Blue Attack Agents (BAAs); it is possible that the BAs are 
equipped both to see and to shoot, e.g. be Un-Manned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), 
or armed Fixed Wing Manned Aircraft, or combinations thereof. The BSAs search the 
subregion “at random,” and then signal, either through a central C2 authority, or directly, 
e.g., by “chat,”P2 P to loitering BAAs when the RA is detected. Once signaled, the BAAs are 
given the detected RA’s location and proceed thereto. 
Assume the rate of arrival near to Red’s location of any BAA after being signaled is 
Markovian with rate λ  (which may depend on region or terrain), so the time a typical 
BAA requires finding and “attaching to” the visible RA, initiating the formation of an 
Engagement Pack (EP),P3 P has an exponential distribution with mean 1/λ  independently of 
the other BAAs. This formulation may be altered to reflect the particular behavior of 
various communication-network-forming (Peer-to-Peer=P2P) protocols.P4-7 P When an EP 
has reached a to-be-determined size b  it (the entire EP) attacks/fires upon the RA if the 
RA remains visible. If the RA senses an EP, or if it finishes its assigned mission before 
the EP( b ) fully forms, it immediately hides; the BSA-BAA mission is a failure, and the 
Red-Hide, Blue-Seek process begins again.  There are certain tradeoffs: if s bn n>>  then a 
visible RA may be found quickly, but relatively small EPs may be optimal because larger 
assemblies could alert the visible Red to hide; this lowers the lethality of B on R  
(but deters hostile SCUD launches). It is clear that if bb n≤  is too small, low  
Blue-on-Red attack lethality may occur, while if b  is set too large the chance increases 
that the visible RA (potential target) senses the threat, or hastily completes its mission, 
and disappears. There can clearly be an optimal EP size, and the latter may realistically 
evolve over time as learning by both sides occurs. Also, the latter may depend on 
physical/environmental conditions, such as ducting.P8 P 
2. A Renewal Model for Blue vs. Red in a Subregion 
Let there be sn  BSAs, and suppose each independently searches for a visible RA over 
the distinguished subregion, and let a typical random visible period for the RA be of 
independent random duration V  with distribution FV  with ( )0 0F =V ; (it is realistic that 
Red may alter the latter over time and experience with near-misses by Blue, but we do 
not address this gaming aspect of the problem at this stage). If the RA becomes visible  
(at t=0), then some BSA detects it at time x=D  if ( )x= <D V ; let the Poissonian search 
rate of the BSA force be snξ ξ= ; independence then implies that the probability the RA 
is detected before it hides is 
( ) ( ) ( )
0
ˆ1 1xd Vp BR F x e dx F
ξξ ξ
∞




( ) ( )
0
ˆ xF e F dx E eξ ξξ
∞
− −⎡ ⎤= ≡ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ VV V ;           (2) 
coincidentally, the Laplace-Stieltjes transform for the distribution function (d.f.) of V . 
Let H  with d.f. FH  having Laplace-Stieltjes transform ( )Hˆ s  denote an arbitrary 
hiding time; and let ( ){ }nH  and ( ){ }nV  be mutually independent sequences of 
independent, identically distributed random variables. It is easily possible to allow their 
distributions to be conditional on, say, environmental factors (ducting, sea state, terrain, 
etc.) and on the actual types of RAs and BAs in play. 
2.1. The Visibility Detection Process is Terminating Renewal 
The temporal history of a RA can be (initially) modeled and analyzed, e.g., by 
probabilistic mathematics or Monte Carlo simulation, as an alternating renewal process.P9 P 
Suppose the RA initially begins hiding. Then assume it is in hiding during the random 
intervals 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0, 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 2 ,....⎡ ⎤ ⎡ + + + ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦H H V H V H  
It is visible on the complementary intervals 
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To model detection of the RA requires the BSA surveillance capability, which is 
represented as occurring at rate snξ ξ=  over the subregion. 
2.2. Model 
Take this convenient if simplified approach to BSA detection. If an element of BSA 
force arrives when the RA is hiding, no detection of the RA is possible, whereas if the 
hidden RA becomes visible (for time V ) then assume that its detection occurs if a BSA 
unit arrives near the RA location at time D after the RA emerges and before it hides 
again. The probability of this event is given by (1) above (assume that the RA does not 
detect the BSA and immediately hide; such capability could induce a more surreptitious 
BSA concept of operations (CONOPS)). 
Let DT  denote the random first BSA detection time of a visible RA, given that RA 
has initially become visible at time 0. Then 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )'
                               if < 1 ,
1 1       if > 1
D
D
⎧⎪= ⎨ + +⎪⎩
D D V
T
V H T D V
          (3) 
where '  DT  is an independent replica of  DT . It is straightforward to calculate the 
Laplace-Stieltjes transform DsE e−⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
T : 
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where snξ ξ= . Setting s=0 shows that DT  terminates in finite time with probability one. 
The Laplace transform of { }DP t>T  is 
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Let 0s →  to see that 








ξ ξ= + −
V
V
T H .           (6) 
On the set <D V  let 0 = −V V D , the remaining time the RA is visible. The Laplace 
transform of the remaining time the RA is visible on the set the RA is detected before it 
hides is 
( ) ( )
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This development assumes that just one detection by a BSA (the first such) is sufficient 
to begin to enroll an EP (capable of lethal action, or possibly pilot recovery). Otherwise, 
P2P communication could be used to develop a corroborative group of observers.P10-12P 
2.3. The Probability an EP of Size b  Attaches to the Detected RA Before it Hides 
Assume once the RA is detected, BAAs attach to it after independent exponential 
times each having mean 1/λ  while the RA is visible. Note that more rapid EP assembly 
may be achieved by using a more sophisticated and situationally adapted P2P discipline. 
Many alternatives are possible and adaptable to changed circumstances; these are  
under investigation. 
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where bT  is the time to form an EP of size b  and b  is the number of BAAs in the 
subregion for b b≤ . 
2.4. The Probability the Detected RA is Killed Before it Hides 
Given b , the number of BAAs in a region, we calculate the probability of Blue’s 
successful kill of a discovered RA. Mathematically, this amounts to 
( ) ( ) { }( ) ( )0 0 0|, | 1 1b bK KbP b b E P h p< ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= ≤ − −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦V D V T V V
 
 ,                   (10) 
where bT  is the time of first passage to b present in an EP, b b≤ , and h  is the 
probability that an individual BAA’s arrival does not cause the RA to hide. The term 
( )1 1 bKp− −   denotes the probability that if all b  BAAs attached to the RA shoot, at least 
one hits/kills the RA; this assumes independence and simultaneous independent Blue 
firing success probabilities, all of which can be modified for more realism. The 
conditional probability the RA is killed before it hides, given the RA is detected during a 
visible period, is thus 
( )


















,                    (11) 
where ( )sφ  is defined in (8). 
2.5. Model with Additional C2 Time 
In addition to the time to assemble an EP there can be an additional 
planning/command time, S, which we assume has an exponential distribution with mean 
1/α , independent of the time to assemble the EP. This assumption can be justified on the 
basis of heavy-traffic queueing theory.P13P This is the traditional C2/I or C4ISR Central 
Command Time/latency; it may conservatively ensure against errors, but adds a latency 
penalty to Blue response. A visible RA is engaged if the time to assemble the EP, plus the 
planning/command time, is less than the remaining time the RA is visible. See detailed 
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In this case, the conditional probability the RA is killed before it hides, given it is 
detected, is 
( )
( ) ( )
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2.6. Numerical Illustration 
In this example, the time to detect a visible RA is given an exponential distribution 
with mean 4 minutes. The RA is visible for a random time having a gamma distribution 
with mean 15 minutes and shape parameter 50. The probability the target hides when a 
new BAA joins the EP is 0. Table 1 displays the probabilities a visible RA is killed when 
it is engaged by various sizes of EPs. The time for a BAA to join an EP has an 
exponential distribution independent of the other BAAs. 
Table 1. Conditional probability an engaged visible target is killed given the size of the EP. 








Figure 1 displays the probability of killing the RA during its visible period for  
3 different mean additional C2 times; the mean times are 0, 3 minutes, and 5 minutes.  In 
all cases, the mean time until a BAA joins an EP is 3 minutes. For each EP size, the 
number of BAAs in the region equals the needed size of the EP. The probability of killing 
the detected RA during its visible period is maximized for an EP of size 3 for all cases. 
The probability the RA will hide before a 4Pth P BA joins an EP of size 3 nullifies the benefit 
of the increased probability of kill that an EP of size 4 has. Increasing the mean C2 time 
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Figure 1. Probability of killing a detected RA during its remaining visible period versus the size of 
the EP. The length of the visible period has a gamma distribution with mean 15 minutes. and shape 
50. The time to detect a visible target has an exponential distribution with mean  
4 minutes. The time for a BAA to join an EP has an exponential distribution with mean  
3 minutes. Note that the optimal EP size is about the same for all cases, but the actual kill 
probabilities are highly time-sensitive. 
 
Figure 2 displays the probability the detected RA is killed during its remaining visible 
period for three cases with different mean times for a BAA to join an EP: 3 minutes,  
4.5 minutes, and 6 minutes; the additional C2 time is equal to 0 for all three cases. For 
each EP size, the number of BAAs in the region is equal to the EP size. Note that the 
mean time to form an EP of size one for each case is the same as that in Figure 1. The 
probability of killing the detected RA during its remaining visible time is maximized for 
an engagement pack of size 3. Increasing the mean time for a BA to join an EP decreases 
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Figure 2. Probability of killing the detected RA during its remaining visible period versus the size of 
the EP. The length of the visible period has a gamma distribution with mean 15 minutes and shape 
50. The time to detect a visible target has an exponential distribution with mean 4 minutes There is 
no additional C2 time. 
 
The decrease becomes larger the larger the size of the EP. Comparison with Figure 1 
reveals that for an engagement of size 5, increasing the mean time for a BAA to join an 
EP results is smaller probability of kill than increasing the mean additional C2 time for 
the cases considered. 
3. Conclusions 
A stochastic model for the effect of a P2P-enabled C2 architecture on the 
effectiveness of time-critical targeting has been presented. The numerical example 
suggests that P2P can result in increased targeting effectiveness over a centralized  
C2 architecture. However, if P2P results in an increased time to assemble an engagement 
pack to engage the target over that using a centralized C2 architecture, or if there are too 
many errors or too much jamming or interference, then its benefits can be nullified. The 
model is optimistic in that it assumes that all BAAs are available to join an EP when a 
target is detected and Red is not attempting to disrupt the P2P communication. The model 
can be modified to represent the consequences of different P2P communication networks. 
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